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Abstract
Psychological investigations have led to considerable in-
sight into the working of the human language compre-
hension system. In this article, we look at a set of prin-
ciples derived from psychological findings to argue for
a particular organization of linguistic knowledge along
with a particular processing strategy and present a com-
putational model of sentence processing based on those
principles. Many studies have shown that human sen-
tence comprehension is an incremental and interactive
process in which semantic and other higher-level infor-
mation interacts with syntactic information to make in-
formed commitments as early as possible at a local am-
biguity. Early commitments may be made by using top-
down guidance from knowledge of different types, each
of which must be applicable independently of others.
Further evidence from studies of error recovery and de-
layed decisions points toward an arbitration mechanism
for combining syntactic and semantic information in re-
solving ambiguities. In order to account for all of the
above, we propose that all types of linguistic knowledge
must be represented in a common form but must be
separable so that they can be applied independently of
each other and integrated at processing time by the ar-
bitrator. We present such a uniform representation and
a computational model called COMPERE based on the
representation and the processing strategy.
Introduction
Psychological investigations of human language process-
ing have led to considerable insight into the working of
the language processor. Yet, attempts to build psycho-
logically real computational models of language process-
ing face considerable problems in translating the con-
straints put forth by psycholinguistic theories into the
representations and processes that constitute the com-
putational model. In this article, we summarize a large
body of evidence from psycholinguistic literature into a
set of principles and use them to derive a computational
model of human sentence processing that employs a par-
ticular control of processing and a uniform representa-
tion of all linguistic knowledge.
We argue that, in order to explain a large variety of
findings in human sentence comprehension, the compu-
tational model must employ a single arbitration pro-
cess that can integrate independently proposed syntac-
tic and semantic information to resolve ambiguities. We
present a uniform representation for syntactic and se-
mantic knowledge that enables syntactic and seman-
tic interpretations to be integrated through intermedi-
ate representations. The representational primitive is
a node that specifies part-of and has-part relations to
other nodes, preconditions on these relations, and ex-
pectations that could be generated from such relations.
We show how such representations could be employed
by a parser that makes the right commitments at the
appropriate times in order to explain a variety of hu-
man sentence processing behaviors such as incremental
interpretation, immediacy of semantic and conceptual
interaction, modular behaviors such as purely structural
preferences, early commitment and error recovery, gar-
den paths, and resource-limited delayed decisions. We
have developed a model called COMPERE (Cognitive
Model of Parsing and Error Recovery) based on such an
architecture and tested it in a computer implementation.
Psychological Constraints on Language
Comprehension Models
Experimental observations of human sentence processing
behavior can be summarized in terms of a set of princi-
ples including the following:
1. Incremental Comprehension:
Psychological experiments have confirmed the general
intuition that human language comprehension is an in-
cremental process of progressively building a syntactic,
semantic, and referential interpretation of a sentence.
(e.g., Crain and Steedman, 1985; Marslen-Wilson and
Tyler, 1987; Steedman, 1989; Taraban and McClelland,
1988).
2. Early Commitment:
The sentence processor must make early commitments
as soon as it has the information necessary to do so
(e.g., Crain and Steedman, 1985; Frazier, 1987). Re-
source limitations such as working memory capacity and
the real-time nature of the comprehension task forbid
the processor from pursuing all possible paths in parallel
until they are ruled out (MacDonald, Just, and Carpen-
ter, 1992). It must use information available from every
knowledge source to make a choice as early as possible.
3. Delayed Decisions:
However, the processor must pursue parallel interpreta-
tions sometimes to account for delayed decisions. When
syntactic and semantic preferences are in conflict, the
processor must postpone the decision until further infor-
mation becomes available (Holmes et al., 1989) or un-
til a decision is forced by limits of memory resources.
Moreover, at the resource limit, it appears that syntac-
tic preferences override any semantic preferences (Stowe,
1991). Delayed decisions have also been observed in the
presence of lexical ambiguities.
4. Error Recovery:
Early commitment inevitably leads to erroneous deci-
sions at times when later information proves an earlier
choice incorrect. The processor must also be able to
recover from such errors by switching to an alternative
interpretation (e.g., Eiselt, 1989; Stowe, 1991). This er-
ror recovery whether in structural or lexical ambiguity
resolution, should be possible through a repair process
that is incremental. Some parts of the erroneous struc-
tures should be reused and others repaired to result in
correct structures. Mere reprocessing from scratch does
not explain the grades of difficulty exhibited by weak
and strong garden-path sentences (Abney, 1989).
5. Interaction:
Apart from incremental processing, the processor sup-
ports interaction between different faculties such as syn-
tax, semantics, and reference (e.g., Crain and Steedman,
1985; Marslen-Wilson and Tyler, 1987; Taraban and Mc-
Clelland, 1988). Natural languages are replete with am-
biguities which cannot all be resolved by the use of any
one kind of knowledge. An incremental processor builds
interpretations of an incomplete sentence at all the dif-
ferent levels that interact with each other and chooses an
interpretation that is best with respect to all the knowl-
edge available to the processor at that point. Incremen-
tality, interaction, early commitment, and error recovery
can together explain the ability of the human language
processor to deal with the proliferation of local ambi-
guities in natural languages (e.g., Crain and Steedman,
1985).
6. Functional Independence:
A final constraint derivable from a vast body of psy-
cholinguistic studies can be summarized by stating that
each kind of knowledge must be capable of being applied
independently of other kinds. For instance, it must be
possible to apply purely structural principles to resolve
an attachment ambiguity for an adjunct. This syntactic
knowledge must be represented so that it can be ap-
plied no matter what lexical items are involved in the
adjunct (Frazier, 1987; Frazier, 1989). Independence is
also necessary to explain the behavior seen when de-
lays in commitment are terminated by resource limits
(Stowe, 1991). Another important source of evidence
for functional independence between levels of language
processing lies in behavioral studies with aphasic sub-
jects (e.g., Caramazza and Berndt, 1978). Though the
neurological independence between syntactic and seman-
tic knowledge has been questioned by recent studies of
cross-linguistic aphasia (Bates, Wulfeck, and MacWhin-
ney, 1991), functional independence would still be nec-
essary to explain the differential impairment of syntactic
and semantic abilities in aphasia (Mahesh, 1993).
Moreover, in order to make sure that the actual course
of steps in the model agrees with human behavior, not
just the end results of processing, the representations,
processes, and resources used by the model must all be
truthful to psychological data.
The need to combine bottom-up and
top-down processes
Data-driven models of language comprehension with
bottom-up strategies are compatible with incremental
semantic interpretation. Incremental comprehension is
best described by a bottom-up strategy that interprets
each successively larger constituent as it is built from the
next word in the sentence. A top-down strategy would
force the processor to commit to a whole constituent be-
fore analyzing the parts of the whole. Making such com-
mitments when the processor does not have necessary
information results in unwarranted backtracking.
Standard theories of syntax using phrase-structure
rules are incompatible with incremental processing given
that the steps taken by the parser be psychologically
real (Steedman, 1989). Though it is possible to apply a
bottom-up strategy to phrase-structure rules, the result-
ing process will not be incremental since the bottom-up
parser waits until it has seen every daughter of a con-
stituent before interpreting it. Phrase-structure rules
can be applied to carry out an incremental interpretation
only if sentences have a left-branching structure which
is not true with a majority of natural languages (Steed-
man, 1989). What we need is a bottom-up parser with
top-down guidance that can make early commitments
before actually seeing every part of a constituent so that
semantic interpretation can be incremental. Such early
commitments may be made by employing top-down in-
fluence from a variety of types of knowledge.
Types of Top-Down Guidance to
Bottom-Up Parsing
Information providing top-down guidance to the pro-
cessor can be of three types: grammatical information
about the categories involved (Steedman, 1989), general
structural principles (Frazier, 1989), and feedback from
semantics, reference and discourse interpretation (e.g.,
Crain and Steedman, 1985; Taraban and McClelland,
1988).
1. Syntactic Expectation:
Grammatical information tells the processor about the
arguments that must follow before the current con-
stituent can be complete (and hence grammatical). For
instance, after seeing a noun phrase, a verb must follow
for the sentence to be complete. We can say that the pro-
cessor can expect to see a verb phrase at this point. The
bottom-up parser can use such syntactic expectations to
make early commitments at syntactic ambiguities. This
grammatical preference for expected structures results
in the same behavior as expected by the minimal at-
tachment principle and explains garden-path behavior
in reduced relative clause sentences such as (1).
(1) The officers taught at the academy were
very demanding.
2. Semantic and Pragmatic Preference:
One way to introduce extra-grammatical top-down influ-
ence on attachment ambiguities is through interaction.
Semantic and discourse processes feedback to syntactic
processing and exert preferences for some attachments
over others (e.g., Crain and Steedman, 1985; Stowe,
1991). For instance, semantic feedback can tell the pro-
cessor that the prepositional phrase (PP) in sentence (2)
must be attached to the noun phrase (NP) since a horse
cannot be used as an instrument for seeing.
(2) The officer saw the soldier with the horse.
3. Structural Preference:
The processor must also be able to exert purely struc-
tural preferences that are independent of the categories
and lexical items involved in the ambiguous parts of the
sentence. Examples of such a preference are right as-
sociation and minimal attachment (Frazier, 1987). Such
syntactic generalizations allow the syntactic processor to
make early commitments for adjuncts as well, thereby
explaining several syntactic phenomena (Frazier, 1989).
There is psychological evidence in structural ambiguity
resolution which demonstrates the need for this kind
of top-down influence. For instance, Stowe (1991) has
shown that the human sentence processor delays a deci-
sion (i.e., does not do an early commitment) when there
is a conflict between syntactic and semantic preferences
at a structural ambiguity (i.e., when top-down influence
from grammar or structural principles and those from
semantic feedback contradict each other). Experiments
showed that people continue to delay the decision and
pursue multiple interpretations until they reach resource
limits. At the limit, they make a choice based only on
syntactic preferences. This result would be left unex-
plained but for the presence of a top-down influence of
the structural kind.
The Control of Parsing
Top-down guidance from syntactic expectations and
structural preferences can be integrated with a bottom-
up control of parsing by employing a form of left-corner
parsing (Abney and Johnson, 1991). We have developed
a variant of left-corner parsing by adding to it the virtues
of head-driven parsing. The resulting mechanism that
we call Head-Signaled Left Corner Parsing produces the
right sequence of syntactic commitments to account for
a variety of data. The parser has been implemented in
the COMPERE model. Lack of space prevents us from
further describing the parsing mechanism here, but it is
described elsewhere (Mahesh, 1994).
The Need for an Arbitration Mechanism
While top-down and bottom-up influences on sentence
comprehension arising from syntactic sources of knowl-
edge can be combined in the parsing algorithm men-
tioned above, the sentence processor must also combine
information coming from semantic and conceptual analy-
ses with the syntactic preferences. This communication
between syntax and semantics is necessary to account
for evidence from interaction, delayed decisions, early
commitment, and error recovery. The left-corner pars-
ing algorithm merely identifies the points when the com-
munication ought to occur but doesn’t tell us how the
communication is handled or how conflicts are resolved
in the best interests of the constraints on behavior. One
way to do this is to integrate the representations of the
two types of knowledge a priori as in semantic grammars
and what are called grammatical constructions in certain
other models (e.g., Jurafsky, 1991). Such an approach
suffers from reduced generativity and other disadvan-
tages (see the Related Work section below). In order
to avoid losing generativity, the sentence processor must
keep the knowledge sources separate and introduce an
arbitration mechanism that dynamically combines infor-
mation arising from independent syntactic and semantic
sources, resolving any conflicts that might arise in the
process.
The arbitrator needs to combine information coming
from independent syntactic and semantic sources which
talk in different terms. Syntax describes its interpreta-
tions in terms of grammatical relations such as subject
and object relations while semantics talks in terms of
thematic roles.1 The arbitrator must establish corre-
spondences between these two representations (and be-
tween the decisions made by the two). One way to bridge
this communication gap between the languages of syn-
tax and semantics is to add a translation procedure in
1For purposes of illustration and simplicity, we are em-
ploying thematic-role assignment using selectional prefer-
ences from the lexicon as our theory of semantics. Our ap-
proach however is not limited to thematic roles. For an ex-
ample of a more structured theory of semantics, see (Peterson
and Billman, 1994).
the arbitrator. This procedure would translate gram-
matical relations to thematic relations and vice versa
using other kinds of linguistic information such as ac-
tive/passive voice, what roles go with a particular event,
and so on.
There are two problems with this approach. First, it
is a procedural solution with well-known disadvantages
over a comparable declarative solution. Second, during
error recovery in incremental sentence comprehension,
corresponding things will have to be undone in syntax
and semantics. This is problematic if the only represen-
tation of the correspondence is in the arbitration pro-
cedures, since correspondence knowledge is not present
in the representations that need to be manipulated by
error recovery mechanisms. Also, the only kind of recov-
ery possible is through reprocessing because there are
no representations of intermediate decisions to repair or
backtrack to.
We propose an alternative to this in which the gap
is bridged via intermediate representations. These in-
termediate roles connect grammatical relations to the-
matic roles, resulting in a declarative representation of
the correspondence knowledge in the form of role hierar-
chies. Now, with this mechanism, during error recovery,
the processor can backtrack just the right amount and
recover from the error by repairing the erroneous struc-
ture rather than reprocessing from scratch.
Role hierarchies that bridge the gap between syntac-
tic phrases and thematic roles for example sentences are
shown in Figure 1.2 As the sentence progresses from
that in (a) to the one in (b) or the one in (c), we can
see the role structures being repaired to recover from lo-
cal errors. It can also be seen that while both (b) and
(c) involve repairs to role hierarchies, (c) also involves
a reorganization of its syntactic structure to accommo-
date its reduced relative structure. Thus (c) is more of
a garden-path sentence than (b).
The Uniform Representation
In order for the single arbitration process to manipulate
both syntactic and semantic types of knowledge both
during early commitments and error recovery, we pro-
pose a uniform representation of all types of knowledge.
The elements of the uniform representation are units
called nodes comprised of (a) part-whole links, (b) pre-
conditions, (c) expectations, and (d) preference levels.
The representations are to be read as (Fig. 2a) “the
parts can be linked to the wholes when the precondi-
tions are met and if so, the corresponding expectations
can be generated at that point.” A node represents all
the knowledge about a syntactic or semantic category.
Sample representations of syntactic and semantic knowl-
edge in this general form are shown in parts (b) and (c)
2For simplicity, syntactic structures that are linked to the
role hierarchies are not shown.
Event: "teach"
Agent
Active-Subject
Subject
NP: "the officers" VP: "taught"
(a) The officers taught.....
Event: "teach"
Subject
NP: "the officers" VP: "taught" PP: "by the men"
Passive-Subject
Experiencer
By-NP
Passive-By-NP
Agent
(b)  The officers taught by the men.....
Event: "teach"
Agent
Active-Subject
Subject
NP: "the officers" VP: "taught" PP: "at the academy"
At-NP
Location
Passive-Subject
Experiencer
Event: "give"
VP: "gave....."
(c)  The officers taught at the academy gave.....
Figure 1: Role Hierarchies: From Phrases to Thematic
Roles.
of Figure 2. The NP node specifies the wholes S, VP, and
PP of which it can be a part along with the preconditions
and expectations therein. Similarly, the semantic node
specifies knowledge of the thematic roles that go with
a Teach event and the preconditions on the role fillers.
The examples shown in Figure 2 are, however, simplified
and incomplete.
Intermediate roles such as Active-Subject, Non-Agent-
Active-Subject, and Passive-By-NP are used to bridge
the grammatical and thematic relations between the
parts of a sentence. Their use in backtracking during
error recovery can be seen by examining the transition
from (a) to (b) and (a) to (c) in the examples in Figure
1.
NODE:
......
A: a node
Part-of:
Part-of:
Preconditions:
Expectations:
Expectations:
Preconditions:
NP:
Part-of:
Expectations:
Preconditions:
Part-of:
Expectations:
Preconditions:
Part-of:
Expectations:
Preconditions:
S
(precede NIL)
(follow VP)
VP
(precede V)
PP
(precede PREP)
TEACH:
Expectations:
Preconditions:
Expectations:
Preconditions:
Expectations:
Preconditions:
C: a semantic nodeB: a syntactic node
Has-part:
Has-part:
Has-part: Agent
(must-be animate)
Experiencer
Location
(must-be place)
(must-be animate)
......
Figure 2: Uniform Representation of Linguistic Knowl-
edge.
As an alternative to uniform representations, if there
are separate representations of different types of knowl-
edge in different forms, it becomes hard to support incre-
mental interaction in view of the constraint that the time
course of actions taken by the processor must be psy-
chologically real. Especially in the case of error recovery
phenomena, it is elegant to have an arbitration process
which processes all the kinds of knowledge (i.e., applies
common operations on different kinds of knowledge) so
that it can make corresponding changes to syntactic and
semantic interpretations while recovering from an error.
Processing with Uniform Representations
The arbitration process has been implemented in a sen-
tence understanding program called COMPERE. Its sin-
gle arbitration process reads words in a left-to-right or-
der, proposes ways of attaching them syntactically and
semantically to previously built structures, follows the
left-corner parsing algorithm mentioned above in pro-
ducing the right sequence of decisions, and selects the
most preferred attachments at each point by combining
the preferences assigned to the alternative attachments
proposed bottom-up with the grammatical, semantic,
and structural types of top-down influence. COMPERE
produces tree structures representing the syntactic struc-
ture and thematic role assignment for a sentence. It
is capable of representing and pursuing multiple inter-
pretations in parallel when a conflict between syntactic
and semantic preferences forces a delay in resolving an
ambiguity. Further details of COMPERE’s processing
mechanisms can be found in (Mahesh, 1993; Eiselt et al,
1993).
COMPERE’s arbitration process retains alternative
interpretations that it did not select in the first place.3
If an error is detected at a later point (when there is
no way to attach a new constituent, for instance), it re-
covers from the error by switching over to one of the
retained alternatives, performing any repairs to the syn-
tactic and role structures (as shown in Fig. 1 for exam-
ple) (Eiselt et al., 1993; Holbrook et al., 1992). The in-
termediate roles in the role hierarchies help maintain the
correspondence between the changes made to the syntac-
tic and semantic structures. COMPERE maintains the
correspondence information by uniformly connecting ev-
ery syntactic node to its corresponding semantic node(s)
(including the intermediate roles) and vice versa.
In order to model the variety of behaviors, including
the findings of Stowe (1991) on limited delayed decisions,
the arbitration process must be enhanced by imposing
architectural constraints, such as resource limits. The
control structure of the process can then order the pref-
erences based on their cost in terms of resources such
as working memory. For instance, limited delayed de-
cisions can be modeled by ordering semantic influence
on par with syntactic preferences to begin with and by
ignoring the semantic preferences when the processor
has run out of resources. COMPERE’s separation of
knowledge sources retains the functional independence
between them which is necessary for the above enhance-
ments.
COMPERE can deal with a variety of (psy-
cho)linguistically interesting constructs such as relative
clause sentences, complements, and prepositional ad-
juncts with both lexical and structural ambiguities (in-
cluding the ones used in the examples above). It can ana-
3For an account of the Conditional Retention theory of
error recovery, see (Eiselt 1989).
lyze their syntax and assign thematic roles. For example,
it can show why sentence (1) is a garden-path sentence
using grammatical expectations and early commitment;
it can recover from the garden path to reinterpret the
sentence; and it can use immediate semantic interaction
to show why sentence (3) is not a garden path. The pro-
gram has demonstrated the computational feasibility of
the uniform representation and the arbitration process.
However, its semantic competence is limited to thematic
role assignment and at this time it does not have the
knowledge to carry out discourse and reference process-
ing.
(3) The courses taught at the academy were
very demanding.
Related Work
Though incremental interaction between syntax and se-
mantics is not a new idea in computational modeling
of human sentence comprehension, previous models that
subscribed to such an interactive view have sacrificed
the ability to apply syntactic and semantic knowledge
independently of each other. While syntax-semantics in-
teraction helps us explain a variety of psychological data,
it is certainly not sufficient to account for the data on
purely structural preferences, on deferred decisions with
limited delays, and on error recovery phenomena (Eiselt
et al., 1993). Below we briefly describe why some of the
other models cannot explain the apparently incompati-
ble data on modular effects (which functional indepen-
dence can explain) as well as interactive effects (which
incremental interaction can explain).
Models with Integrated Representations: These
models resort to an a priori integration of knowledge
sources with a consequent loss of functional indepen-
dence (e.g., Jurafsky, 1991).
Categorial Grammars: Categorial grammars which
establish a strong correspondence between syntactic and
semantic categories (Steedman, 1989) also lack func-
tional independence between syntax and semantics.
NL-SOAR: Though this model, a contemporary of
COMPERE, has a uniform representation and integrates
multiple knowledge sources to resolve ambiguities, it can-
not account for delayed decisions since it can only main-
tain one interpretation at a time. In addition, its chunk-
ing operations result in the integration of different types
of knowledge with a consequent loss in functional inde-
pendence (e.g., Lehman et al., 1991; Lewis, 1993).
Connectionist Models: Connectionist models of sen-
tence processing (e.g., Waltz and Pollack, 1985), includ-
ing the Competition Model of MacWhinney and Bates
(Bates et al., 1991), also have uniform representations.
However, they do not deal very well with the full syntac-
tic complexity of natural language. It is yet to be seen if
the simple computational mechanisms of activation and
inhibition in a network can exercise enough control of
Table 1: How COMPERE meets psychological con-
straints.
Constraint Features of COMPERE
1. Incrementality Head-Signaled Left-Corner
parsing algorithm.
2. Early Commitment Grammatical, structural, and
semantic top-down guidance
to the parser.
3. Delayed Decisions Arbitration mechanism and
retention of alternatives.
4. Error Recovery Arbitration mechanism,
retention, uniform rep.,
declarative rep. of syntax-
semantics correspondence
through intermediate roles.
5. Semantic Interaction Arbitration of independently
proposed syntactic and
semantic preferences.
6. Functional Independence Separate representation of
syntactic and semantic
knowledge.
processing to model the precise mechanisms of arbitra-
tion, error recovery, and delayed decisions.
Conclusion
Table 1 summarizes the features of COMPERE that help
us satisfy the psychological constraints we started with.
We have shown that in order to explain a variety of hu-
man sentence processing behaviors, the sentence proces-
sor must use a bottom-up strategy and yet accommo-
date top-down influence from grammatical, semantic,
discourse, and structural preferences. We presented a
uniform representation of different kinds of knowledge in
a common format but in separate units. Using this repre-
sentation, we showed how we can arbitrate syntactic and
semantic processes and account for a range of behaviors.
We have demonstrated the computational feasibility of
the model in the COMPERE program. We believe that
the combination of an arbitration mechanism and a uni-
form representation will take us a long way in modeling
human sentence processing behavior.
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